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THE EFFECTS OF COPAYMENTS ON THE USE OF MEDICAL SERVICES
AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN UTAH’S MEDICAID PROGRAM
By Leighton Ku, Elaine Deschamps and Judi Hilman1

Summary
In recent years, a number of states have increased cost-sharing for low-income Medicaid
beneficiaries as one approach to Medicaid cost-containment. While copayments have been most
commonly applied to prescription drugs, they also have been assessed for other services, such as
physician visits, hospital admission, or outpatient clinic use.
Prior research has found that when low-income patients are required to pay more for
health care services or for prescription drugs, they use fewer services or medications.2 In some
cases, their health could deteriorate, with the result that they may subsequently require more
expensive emergency room or inpatient hospital care. While private insurance often requires
copayments, the low-income patients covered by Medicaid are more likely to experience adverse
consequences from copayments because they have a more difficult time affording higher
copayments for medications or doctor visits. Low-income patients are also more likely to have
fragile health.
This paper presents findings from an analysis of data about changes in the use of medical
services and prescription drugs that occurred after “nominal” copayments were instituted in
Utah’s Medicaid program in the 2001-2002 period, based on data collected by the Utah
Department of Health (UDOH).3 Our analyses take advantage of the natural experiment that
occurred after copayments were imposed on Medicaid beneficiaries. We conclude that:
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•

$220 copayments for inpatient hospital care reduced hospital admissions;

•

$2 copayments for physician services led Medicaid patients to see doctors less often, and
increasing copayments to $3 caused further reductions;

•

$2 copayments for prescription drugs reduced patients’ use of prescription drugs; and

•

$2 or $3 copayments for outpatient hospital clinic visits lowered the number of such
visits.

Some of our conclusions conflict with those reached by state officials. A UDOH report
concluded that Medicaid beneficiaries in that state did not use less health care after copayments
were imposed.4 This finding has been cited as evidence that copayments do not adverse affect
Medicaid beneficiaries. Our review indicates that portions of the state’s analyses were
technically flawed. This paper presents revised analyses that reassess the impact of the
copayments in Utah.
Our reanalysis finds that the copayments decreased health care utilization for Utah’s
Medicaid beneficiaries. Such a finding is more consistent with other information from Utah, as
well as being more consistent with prior research. For example, UDOH also reported findings
from a survey of Medicaid enrollees in which one-ninth of enrollees reported not seeing a doctor
because they could not afford the physician copayments. When Utah submitted its application
for a Section 1115 waiver that authorized increased copayments for parents, the state assumed
that copayments would reduce health care use and expenditures and that these savings would
finance other parts of the state’s waiver project.5
An underlying goal of Utah’s Medicaid waiver was to foster use of preventive and
primary care in the hope that this would reduce the need for hospitalization. Our analysis
suggests that the Medicaid copayments interfered with the use of physician services and
medications. While hospitalization rates fell, it appears that this occurred because patients could
not afford the copayments. There is no evidence that hospitalizations fell because patients
received more primary or preventive care.
UDOH’s survey of beneficiaries’ experiences with nominal copayments provides other
useful insights into the effect of cost-sharing on low-income Medicaid beneficiaries. While
some did not have problems with the copayments, many others did. Some 42 percent of those
surveyed responded that, “[The copayments for doctor visits and prescription drugs] seem small,
but are actually a huge problem,” and 39 percent reported “They cause serious financial
difficulties for me.”
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While $2 or $3 copayments may seem modest, they can create barriers to the use of
health services for a number of low-income patients. This analysis does not examine whether the
reduction in health care utilization affects the use of “essential” health services or harms patients’
health, but prior studies have found that copayments reduce the use of “essential” as well as “less
essential” services and that the use of fewer essential services contributes to subsequent health
problems or to higher medical expenses if patients become sicker and require more intensive
medical care.6

The Utah Department of Health Report
In 2001 and 2002, the state of Utah began imposing copayments in its Medicaid program
for low-income parents, as well as for low-income senior citizens and people with disabilities.
The state subsequently increased copayments for certain groups.7 Before this time, Utah did not
require copayments. (Under federal Medicaid law, copayments cannot generally be assessed for
children, pregnant women and those in institutions, such as nursing homes.)
The copayments were imposed upon very poor beneficiaries. In Utah the maximum
income eligibility limit for parents in Medicaid is about 54 percent of the poverty line ($8,500
for a family of three). For seniors and people with disabilities, the income limit is $6,800 for a
single person and $10,200 for a couple.
•

Beginning in July 2002, low-income parents were required to pay a $2 copayment for
prescription drugs under the state’s waiver program.

•

In November 2001, Medicaid began charging $2 copayments for physician visits by
parents, seniors and people with disabilities. Pregnant women were exempt. In February
2003, the copayment was raised to $3.

•

In November 2001, the state began charging $2 copayments for outpatient hospital visits
by parents, seniors and people with disabilities. In July 2002, this was increased to $3 for
parents.

•

In February 2002, the state imposed a $220 coinsurance payment for each inpatient
hospitalization.

Projected savings from some of these copayments were used to help finance Utah’s
Primary Care Network waiver. At the request of the state legislature, UDOH conducted a study
of the effect of these policy changes, and a report was released in December 2003. The study
used time-series analyses of changes in the number of fee-for-service Medicaid claims from
6
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January 2001 through mid-2003 to assess changes in service use, a survey of Medicaid enrollees
affected by cost-sharing (324 people responded out of 600 surveys mailed) and several focus
groups. The UDOH study was the most comprehensive analysis of some of the effects of
Medicaid copayments in Medicaid that we have seen a state agency conduct.
UDOH reported the results of five time-series analyses that used econometric models to
examine trends in health care use before and after the copayments were instituted.8 Two of the
five analyses found that significant reductions in utilization occurred after copayments were
imposed:
•

The $2 copayments for drugs led to a statistically significant reduction in the level of
medication use by low-income parents, as measured by the number of fee-for-service
claims. The findings of this analysis indicate that the copayments reduced prescription
drug utilization by about 8 percent.

•

The $2 copayments for outpatient hospital care led to a significant reduction in outpatient
visits for low-income senior citizens and people with disabilities.

UDOH’s survey of Medicaid beneficiaries provided corroborating evidence for these findings:
for example, 13 percent said they did not get a prescription because they could not afford the
copayment.
But UDOH found no statistically significant effects of copayments in three of its
analyses, one for physician visits, one for inpatient hospital use and another for outpatient
hospital use among low-income parents. On the basis of these findings, the state concluded that
in “most cases,” copayments did not significantly affect utilization.9
Our review finds, however, that these analyses were based on models with significant
technical flaws. Figures 1 and 2 present key components of the UDOH models for inpatient
hospital utilization and physician visits. (More technical data about the UDOH models, as well
as our revised analyses that are designed to address the problems in these models, are presented
in the appendix to this paper.) In Figures 1 and 2, the dots represent the actual observed levels of
physician or hospital claims per 1,000 patients in each month, while the solid lines show the
baseline trends estimated by the models — that is, the trends the models estimate would have
occurred if there had been no policy changes. The dashed lines show the estimated trends after
the copayments were instituted and thus how copayments changed utilization, relative to the
estimated baseline.
As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, the models that UDOH used produce highly unusual
baseline estimates. The baselines that UDOH generated estimate that, even without any
8
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Inpatient Hospital Claims per 1,000
Enrollees

Figure 1: UDOH Model for Inpatient Hospital
Utilization
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Figure 2: UDOH Model for Physician Utilization
Physician Claims for 1,000 Enrollees

copayments or other policy
changes, utilization of physician
and inpatient hospital services
would decline a remarkable 45
percent to 70 percent between
late 2001 (just before the
copayments were instituted) and
mid-2003. The models that
UDOH employed make use of a
quadratic (i.e., squared) function
in generating their baseline. Use
of such a function is unusual in
this type of model, and it is the
inclusion of a quadratic function
that produces the curious estimate
that, in the absence of any policy
changes, utilization would fall
dramatically and at an
accelerating pace.
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being almost entirely unrelated to
the copayments. Because of the
assumption that utilization would
have fallen steeply anyway, the
copayments are interpreted as having had only a minimal effect on utilization.

•

Figure 1 shows that inpatient hospital utilization was rising slightly before coinsurance
was imposed. Yet the model used produces the assumption that utilization would have
fallen by 45 percent between August 2001 and May 2003 without any policy changes.

•

Figure 2 shows that utilization for physician visits also was rising slightly before the
copayments were instituted. But under the UDOH model, utilization was estimated to
plummet by 70 percent between August 2001 and June 2003 without any policy changes.
To give a sense of the implausible nature of these assumptions, if the assumed baseline
trends are extended for a longer period, physician utilization would be expected to reach
zero and then become negative by November 2003.

In a commentary on these models and the UDOH analyses that were based on them, Dr.
Henry Aaron, a distinguished economist and expert in health economics at the Brookings
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Institution, concluded that the Utah Department of Health’s “study methodology was invalid.”
Aaron wrote, “It is not legitimate to choose some particular functional form (quadratic, for
example) without providing a basis for that selection. The quadratic form guarantees that a trend
will eventually either rise or fall with accelerating speed. Without some external justification,
this procedure is, well, unjustified; even worse, it is unjustifiable.”10
The UDOH report speculates that utilization might have fallen if Medicaid patients
became healthier in 2002 and 2003, perhaps because new enrollees could be healthier than those
already on Medicaid. But an expected reduction in utilization of this magnitude strains credulity.
First, Utah’s Medicaid eligibility criteria for adults did not change in this period, so there is no
reason to think their health status improved dramatically. Second, earlier research has found that
newly enrolled Medicaid beneficiaries actually have higher utilization than ongoing beneficiaries
because people often enroll in Medicaid when they are experiencing a bout of illness or when
they need care.11
UDOH’s conclusion that baseline utilization was falling steeply is an artifact of the
particular design of the econometric models that UDOH used. Such steep reductions in baseline
utilization run counter to other contemporaneous health care utilization trends in the United
States. We reviewed similar utilization data for the 2001 to 2003 period from Medicare (national
data), Washington state’s Medicaid program and a large private health insurer. All these insurers
experienced increasing rates of physician utilization and slightly rising or stable rates of hospital
utilization during this time period.12
Since the UDOH models incorrectly ascribe the reduction in utilization that occurred in
2002 and 2003 to a falling baseline, the UDOH models minimize the apparent impact of the
copayment increases. For example, in Figure 1, the reduction attributable to the $220
coinsurance for hospital care is minimized because baseline utilization is assumed to fall so
sharply.13 And as Figure 2 indicates, the UDOH model paradoxically indicates that copayments
appear to increase utilization and cause people to see the doctor more often (although these
increases are not statistically significant).14
10
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The findings produced by the UDOH models also contradict other information presented
by UDOH. For example, in its survey of Medicaid enrollees, 11 percent reported that they
avoided making a doctor’s office visit because they could not afford the physician copayments;
this is contrary to the apparent findings cited above that copayments appear to increase physician
visits. (Also of note, when the state originally applied for its Section 1115 waiver, its budget
assumed that there would be reductions in health care utilization and expenditures as a result of
cost-sharing. These savings were assumed to help pay for other aspects of the state’s waiver
proposal.)
UDOH’s analyses of utilization trends for outpatient hospital use for traditional and nontraditional beneficiaries used a similar methodological approach with a curvilinear baseline
trend. One model (for traditional beneficiaries) found that copayments reduced use of outpatient
clinics, while the other (for non-traditional beneficiaries) did not. Both of these models are
problematic and are discussed in more depth in the appendix. The UDOH model for prescription
drug utilization used a different approach. It did not use a curvilinear baseline trend and found
that copayments were associated with a reduction in the use of medications; that model is more
in line with accepted modeling practices for this type of analysis and yields results more
consistent with other evidence and with economic theory.

New Analyses of the Utah Data
In the first part of 2001, before Utah assessed copayments, inpatient hospital and
physician utilization rates were rising slightly.15 Rather than assuming that baseline utilization
was going to plummet deeply, a more credible expectation is that utilization would have either
have continued to rise or flattened out if copayments had not been imposed. (Technical
information about these models is included in the appendix.)
Figure 3 presents our revised analysis of trends in inpatient hospital utilization. This
model uses a baseline (the solid line) that continues to rise slightly throughout the entire 2001 to
mid-2003 period, although the rise is not statistically significant. Compared to this more
plausible baseline, it is clear that the imposition of copayments in February 2002 (showed by the
dashed line) led to a gradual reduction in the number of inpatient hospital visits. The reduction
due to copayments is statistically significant. (Like the UDOH model, this analysis also
examines the effect of a reduction in hospital payment rates instituted in February 2003 and finds
it is not statistically significant.)
We present two alternative models of the effects of copayments on physician utilization
in Figures 4 and 5. While the two alternatives differ in the levels of sophistication and
assumptions about the baseline trend, both models indicate that the copayments significantly
reduced the number of physician visits made by low-income Medicaid patients.
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statistical models.
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Figure 5 presents a more
sophisticated model that includes
seasonal trends and a lag effect.
This model indicates that physician
utilization would have generally
increased in 2002 and 2003,
although it dips upward and
downward at certain seasonal
points. The model shows that the
$2 and $3 copayments are
associated with a significant
reduction in physician visits.
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Figure 5: Revised Model of Physician Utilization,
Including Seasonal Effects
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We also examined the effect
of the copayments on outpatient
hospital use and found that the
copayments led to reduced utilization
(see appendix for more discussion).
We did not reanalyze the effects of
copayments on prescription drug
utilization; UDOH’s model did not
include a quadratic term for the
baseline and was in line with
accepted approaches.
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Figure 3: Revised Model for Inpatient Hospital
Utilization

Physician Claims per 1,000 Enrollees

Figure 4 presents the
simpler model, in which it is
assumed that baseline utilization —
the level of physician visits if
copayments were not imposed —
would have been flat throughout the
2001 to mid-2003 period. In this
model, it is clear that the imposition
of $2 copayments in November
2001 led to a gradual reduction in
the number of physician visits and
the increase of copayments to $3 led
to a further reduction.
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Copayments in Medicaid and SCHIP
Copayments have become more common in Medicaid. The Government Accountability
Office (formerly known as the General Accounting Office) reported that 34 states increased costsharing levels in Medicaid or SCHIP between 2001 and 2003.16
Under federal law, copayments in Medicaid must be “nominal” and certain groups, such
as children, pregnant women and those in institutions, are exempt. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services have sometimes allowed states to increase copayments beyond nominal levels
under Section 1115 waivers, although recent federal court rulings have found that two of these
waivers violate requirements in the Medicaid statute that set forth the circumstances under which
cost-sharing rules may be waived.17
The surveys of beneficiaries that UDOH conducted provide additional insights about how
cost-sharing affects beneficiaries. While some could afford the copayments, many could not.
Two-fifths (43 percent) of those surveyed agreed with the statement that, “[The copayments for
doctor visits and prescription drugs] seem small, but are actually a huge problem,” and 39
percent agreed “They cause serious financial difficulties for me.” All of the Medicaid patients
who were required to make copayments in Utah have incomes below the poverty line, and
finding additional funds to pay for health care can be a challenge for such people. Surveys show
that families living below the poverty line often experience substantial hardships, such as having
difficulties paying their rent or utility bills, skipping meals and being unable to see doctors or
dentists when needed.18 The burdens of copayments tend to be the most severe for those with
chronic or serious health problems, since they need more health care and therefore have to spend
more for copayments.19
Supporters of copayments sometimes claim that copayments just create a financial
incentive for patients to avoid “unnecessary” medical care, implicitly suggesting that patients
continue to get “necessary” care. Studies have repeatedly shown, however, that when
copayments rise, some necessary and appropriate medical care is deterred and some patients
become sicker and subsequently require more intensive or costly medical care.20 Most patients
do not have the clinical understanding to differentiate reliably between more essential and less
16
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Beneficiaries, GAO 04-491, March 2004.
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copayments.

18

Tammy Ouellette, Nancy Burstein, David Long, and Erik Beecroft, Measures of Material Hardship: Final Report,
Report to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services from Abt Associates, April 2004.
19

Bruce Stuart and Christopher Zacker, “Who Bears the Burden of Medicaid Drug Copayment Policies?” Health
Affairs, 18(2):201-12, 1999.

20

Research generally shows that copayments lead to reductions in both more essential and less essential care. The
loss of essential care contributes to subsequent illness and other adverse consequences.

9

essential care and low-income patients may have sufficiently severe budgetary constraints that
they sometimes cannot afford copayments for medical care that they believe are necessary.
The classic RAND health insurance experiment found that poor adults and children who
are subject to cost-sharing received less in the way of “essential” care and became less healthy
than those receiving free care.21 That study also established that low-income people are more
strongly harmed by cost-sharing than those with middle-class incomes. When California’s
Medicaid program raised physician copayments in the 1970s, researchers found that while
physician utilization fell by 6 percent, use of inpatient services climbed by 17 percent, leading to
an apparent (but not statistically significant) increase in total expenditures.22 A recent Canadian
study found that when copayments for prescription drugs were imposed, low-income patients
used far fewer medications, but experienced increases in emergency room use and were more
likely to experience adverse consequences, such as admission to a hospital or nursing home or
death.23
Studies of cost-sharing in the private sector have also found that cost-sharing reduces
health care utilization and expenditures but may have harmful repercussions on the health of
patients or lead to higher treatment costs. One recent study examined the effects of higher
copayments for prescription drugs in a number of private health plans and found that higher
copayments could have adverse health effects even among middle-class patients.24 For example,
there was a substantial reduction in the use of diabetes medications among diabetic patients when
copayments were raised. Another study examined the use of copayments for substance abuse
treatment and found that higher copayments produced savings in the initial round of treatment
but increased the risk that patients relapse and receive further rounds of treatment, which drives
costs up.25
The findings of our analyses of copayments in Utah indicate that even “nominal”
copayments in the range of $2 or $3 can significantly reduce patients’ use of medical care or
prescription drugs when they are applied to poor Medicaid patients. Medicaid patients may be
particularly vulnerable to cost-sharing because they are both poorer and, in general, less healthy
than middle-class privately-insured patients.26 In some cases, states have considered or adopted
21
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copayments that are much larger than those used in Utah; it is reasonable to believe that the risks
are greater when copayments exceed “nominal” levels.
While states have used copayments as a tool to contain Medicaid expenditures, they
should be aware that these policies can have adverse consequences. States should be cautious in
applying cost-sharing to beneficiaries with low incomes. In addition, states should consider how
to minimize harm for those who have chronic health conditions or are in the poorest health, since
the burdens of copayments fall most heavily on those who most need health care or medications.

11

Appendix
Technical Information about the Analyses

In a commentary on the UDOH analysis and the reanalysis presented here, Dr. Henry
Aaron of the Brookings Institution discussed the ways that researchers could evaluate whether
copayments affect health care utilization. He concluded that the analysis conducted by the Utah
Department of Health failed to meet basic criteria:
The gold standard is the randomized experiment. The only thing that differs between two
groups is the experimental intervention. In this case [i.e., the case of the copayments
instituted in Utah], one would have had to randomly assign Medicaid enrollees to two
groups, one of which faced the new rules and one of which did not. Then, one would
compare the use of services between the two groups. The difference would be the effect
of the intervention. This approach was not taken and probably couldn't be taken.
A second approach is to identify two similar groups that differ only in that one is in
Medicaid and one is not. Each group has a trend of usage. Each is subject (presumably)
to the same influences. So the two trends should be similar. If they are not, then, by
definition, the two groups are not similar. Then, the rules change for the Medicaid
group. If the two trends now diverge, then the divergence could be ascribed to the new
rules. This approach is problematic for a whole host of reasons, but it is often the best
that can be used and the econometric literature has been vastly expanded by attempts to
cope with the problems.
A third approach, which the Utah investigators used, is to take one group, determine the
factors accounting for the trend in usage — all of them! — so that one can be confident
that these factors accurately forecast usage. Then, if a new policy is introduced and
actual usage diverges from predicted usage, one can attribute the divergence to the new
policy. This approach requires that one prove conclusively that the factors that allegedly
account for trends in usage actually do so. This is a very difficult standard to meet. But
there are various ways to try to do so. I do not see from the materials presented any
evidence that any of these methods has, in fact, been used [by UDOH].
What are these methods? First, it is not legitimate to choose some particular functional
form (quadratic, for example) without providing a basis for that selection. The quadratic
form guarantees that a trend will eventually either rise or fall with accelerating speed.
Without some external justification, this procedure is, well, unjustified; even worse, it is
unjustifiable. The fact that an actual trend falls (or, in the opposite situation, rises) less or
more rapidly than an unjustified quadratic relationship proves absolutely nothing. That
is [the] fundamental point [of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities’ reanalysis].
And it is right. The fact that a quadratic equation “fits” is neither here nor there. This is
not a matter of statistics, but analytical logic and common sense. What are the factors
that make behavioral sense that would cause service use or enrollment to rise or to fall?
Do the coefficients make sense?27
27

Aaron, op cit.
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The UDOH analysis and our reanalysis rely on an examination of changes in trends in
health care utilization before and after copayments are imposed. This approach can be called an
interrupted time-series analysis, in which the “interruption” is the introduction of copayments.
In principle, it would be useful to have other data that also measure other factors that might
affect utilization, such as the age, health status or income of Medicaid beneficiaries, but these
data were not available for this analysis.
Our analysis and UDOH’s agree on one central point: the utilization of health care
services for Utah’s Medicaid beneficiaries began to drop in late 2001 and continued to drop
through mid-2003. Where we disagree is in explaining what caused the reduction in utilization.
The UDOH analysis suggests that this was because of underlying factors unrelated to the
introduction of copayments, while our analysis indicates that there was a “structural shift” in the
trends that is related to the introduction of copayments. We do not have the type of data (e.g., a
randomized experiment) that allow us to prove rigorously that copayments caused the reduction
in utilization, but the combination of the findings from our econometric analysis, from UDOH’s
surveys of Medicaid beneficiaries and from prior research studies, plus the lack of
contemporaneous reductions in health care utilization in other populations form a strong and
consistent case that copayments (and not other underlying factors) led to reductions in utilization
in Utah.
The results of statistical analyses are shaped by both the underlying data observations and
by how the models are designed and specified. Although we analyze the same data that UDOH
examined, our conclusions differ because our statistical models differ. Our review indicates that
the UDOH models about physician, inpatient and outpatient hospital utilization had two major
shortcomings:
•

The models used by UDOH assumed that baseline utilization trends were curvilinear in
nature and added a quadratic term for time to the equation (months since January 2001
squared). This resulted in a brief rise in utilization, then a steep and accelerating decline.
The inclusion of a quadratic term was unjustifiable, insofar as it inherently assumes that
trends will continuously accelerate downward (or upward). While it is common to see
time-series models that assume that the baseline has a linear shape, is affected by
seasonal trends or is affected by prior levels (i.e., that there are lag effects), it is most
unusual to see a quadratic term in this type of model. As noted earlier, these model
specifications estimated steep reductions in baseline utilization, so steep that utilization
would have soon become negative.

•

The UDOH models also assumed the effects of copayments for physician, inpatient and
outpatient services are felt at once and are constant once the policies are in effect. That
is, the effect in the first month is assumed to be the same as the effect in the twelfth
month. The problem, however, is that most people do not go to the doctor or hospital
every month, so they may not be not aware that copayments have increased when they
first seek medical care. Thus, the consequences are not neither instantaneous nor
constant in effect. A more plausible theory is that awareness of such copayments — and
behavioral responses — gradually become stronger over time. In contrast, the effects of
copayments for prescription drugs are probably more immediate, since a substantial share
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of prescriptions filled are treatments for chronic illnesses. Since chronic users fill their
prescriptions every month, they quickly become aware of the copayments and adjust their
purchasing decisions.
Our approach made two improvements to the UDOH models:
•

Our revised models were specified so that the underlying baseline trends did not assume a
dramatic plunge in utilization. In our inpatient and outpatient hospital utilization models,
we specified models with simple linear terms. In our physician models, we specified two
alternative models, one with a flat time trend and one with seasonal and lag effects.

•

In our revised models, we specified the effect of inpatient hospital, physician and
outpatient hospital copayments as gradually rising in the first 12 months of
implementation and then stabilizing.28 This corresponds to the concept that effects are
gradually felt, as patients become increasingly aware of copayments and make behavioral
adjustments over time rather than all at once.

We would have preferred data from a longer time span, including more months before
copayments were required, to measure baseline trends more precisely. Since UDOH said that
such data were not available, we analyzed the same data used in the UDOH report.
Appendix Tables 1 through 9 present the regression results for both the UDOH models
and our models. To compare the models, the results are presented using regular standard errors
and adjusted R2 measures. 29 The adjusted R2 measures how well each model fits the variation in
the data; a higher R2 value indicates a better statistical fit. For the inpatient models, the UDOH
adjusted R2 is .724, and our adjusted R2 is .732. For the physician model, the UDOH adjusted R2
is .794, while our seasonal model has an adjusted R2 of .846.
The main body of this paper compares the results of models for inpatient hospital and
physician utilization. For the sake of brevity, we have kept most discussion of the outpatient
hospital models to this appendix. UDOH’s model of outpatient utilization for traditional
enrollees (elderly and disabled Medicaid beneficiaries) found that the $2 copayment was
associated with a reduction in utilization (Appendix Table 3), as does ours (Appendix Table 8).
UDOH’s model of outpatient utilization for nontraditional enrollees (low-income parents) failed
to identify significant effects of $2 or $3 copayments (Appendix Table 4), but our model found
that the $3 copayment significantly reduced outpatient utilization, although we did not find a
significant effect for the $2 copayments. For the non-traditional enrollees, the adjusted R2 for
UDOH’s model is .562, while it is .684 for our model.
28

We acknowledge that there is no strong theoretical reason to assume the effect reaches its maximum at 12 months,
as compared to, say, 9 or 15 months, but believe that it is appropriate to assume that there is a point at which the
effect is fully felt and the effect does not grow indefinitely. Variants in which the effects were maximized at 9 or 15
months led to very similar results.

29

In order to make all comparisons equivalent, we had to recompute the UDOH model for physician utilization
because UDOH used “robust” standard errors for the physician model, unlike the other models, which used regular
standard errors. The results were substantively the same for this analysis, whether standard or robust standard errors
were used: the coefficients were the same, and there were no substantive changes in statistical significance.
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Appendix Table 1.
UDOH Model of Inpatient Hospital Utilization

Appendix Table 2.
UDOH Model of Physician Utilization

Dep. Var. = Inpatient Claims per 1,000 enrollees
Indep. Var.
Intercept
Month
Month squared
$220 coinsurance
Hosp rate reduc

Coefficient
19.547
0.350
-0.022
-0.558
1.596

Std Error
1.091
0.193
0.007
1.290
1.601

Dep. Var. = Physician Claims per 1,000 enrollees
Signif
0.001
0.082
0.004
0.669
0.328

Indep. Var.
Intercept
Month
Month squared
$2 copayment
$3 copayment

Adjusted R2
0.724
Note: The copayments are represented as dummy
variables with a value of 1, beginning in the month
of implementation and continuing afterward.

Adjusted R2

Std Error
7.024
1.384
0.037
8.473

Dep. Var. = Outpatient Claims per 1,000 enrollees
Signif
0.001
0.008
0.001
0.018

Indep. Var.
Intercept
Month
Month squared
$2 copayment
$3 copayment

Coefficient
260.880
-0.091
-0.037
-4.552
-4.773

Std Error
8.519
1.666
0.047
10.346
9.862

Signif
0.001
0.957
0.432
0.664
0.633

0.744
0.562
Adjusted R2
Note: See note for Table 1.

Note: See note for Table 1.

Appendix Table 5.
Revised Model of Inpatient Utilization:
Linear Time Trend

Appendix Table 6.
Revised Model of Physician Utilization:
No Time Trend Model

Dep. Var. = Inpatient Claims per 1,000 enrollees
Indep. Var.
Intercept
Month
$220 coinsurance
Hosp rate reduc

Signif
0.001
0.095
0.001
0.110
0.088

Appendix Table 4.
UDOH Model of Outpatient Hospital Utilization
for Nontraditional Enrollees

Dep. Var. = Outpatient Claims per 1,000 enrollees
Coefficient
162.069
4.014
-0.160
-21.386

Std Error
32.493
6.594
0.199
38.176
42.234

Adjusted R2
0.794
Note: See note for Table 1.

Appendix Table 3.
UDOH Model of Outpatient Hospital Utilization
for Traditional Enrollees

Indep. Var.
Intercept
Month
Month squared
$2 copayment

Coefficient
551.483
11.430
-0.793
63.290
75.091

Coefficient
20.355
0.037
-0.573
-0.679

Std Error
0.882
0.098
0.175
1.111

Dep. Var. = Physician Claims per 1,000 enrollees
Signif
0.001
0.708
0.003
0.547

Indep. Var.
Intercept
$2 copayment
$3 copayment

Coefficient Std Error
611.31611 15.205062
-10.698
2.222
-31.928
9.079

Adjusted R2
2

0.732
Adjusted R
Note: The copayments are represented as variables
that gradually rise; they begin at 1 in the first month
of implementation, rise to 2 in the second month, etc.
and peak with a value of 12 in the twelfth and later
months. This emulates the concept that the effects of
copayments gradually rise with time.

Note: See note for Table 5.
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0.692

Signif
0.001
0.001
0.001

Appendix Table 7.
Revised Model of Physician Utilization:
Loglinear Model with Seasonal and Lag Effects

Appendix Table 8.
Revised Model of Outpatient Hospital Utilization:
Traditional Enrollees, Linear Time Trend

Dep. Var. = ln (Physician Claims per 1,000 enrollees)

Dep. Var. = Outpatient Claims per 1,000 enrollees

Indep. Var.
Intercept
One Month Lag
Season Mon 1
Season Mon 2

Coefficient
6.179
0.516
0.173
0.072

Std Error
0.092
0.240
0.054
0.063

Signif
0.000
0.050
0.006
0.273

Indep. Var.
Intercept
Month
$2 copayment

Season Mon 3
Season Mon 4
Season Mon 5
Season Mon 6
Season Mon 7
Season Mon 8
Season Mon 9
Season Mon 10
Season Mon 11
Month
$2 copayment
$3 copayment

0.180
0.172
0.137
0.087
0.018
0.048
0.007
0.138
0.016
0.021
-0.049
-0.113

0.068
0.072
0.074
0.077
0.077
0.075
0.073
0.067
0.055
0.011
0.017
0.025

0.019
0.031
0.086
0.277
0.820
0.534
0.923
0.059
0.779
0.064
0.010
0.001

Adjusted R
Note: See note for Table 5.

Coefficient
172.641
1.021
-4.816

2

Std Error
5.894
0.822
1.349

Signif
0.001
0.225
0.001

0.708

Appendix Table 9.
Revised Model of Outpatient Hospital Utilization:
Nontraditional Enrollees, Linear Time Trend
Dep. Var. = Outpatient Claims per 1,000 enrollees

2

Adjusted R
0.846
Note: See note for Table 5.

Indep. Var.
Intercept
Month
$2 copayment

Coefficient
268.476
-2.014
1.898

Std Error
7.140
-0.959
1.434

Signif
0.001
0.046
0.197

$3 copayment

-2.501

-1.033

0.023

2

Adjusted R
Note: See note for Table 5.
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0.684

